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Government Suits Against In-Service
Conscientious Objectors Who Have
Received Educational Benefits:
An Examination of Justiciability and Damages
A number of military programs offer college, graduate, or pro-
fessional training in exchange for an individual's commitment to
serve a specified tour of duty in the armed forces of the United
States following graduation.' The Government can normally deal
with refusals to perform the agreement to serve by the sanctions of
induction, prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
or, under limited circumstances, 2 alternative civilian service. Re-
The following programs have been the focus of the cases discussed in this comment:
Government-sponsored medical education: The Secretary of the Air Force is authorized
to detail personnel as students at civilian educational institutions by 10 U.S.C. § 9301 (1970).
32 C.F.R. § 888c.30 (1974) provides that where the Government sponsors education toward
the M.D. under such an arrangement, the member will agree to serve three months as a
medical officer for every month (or fraction thereof) of sponsored professional training. Smith
v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973).
Air Force Undergraduate and Advanced Pilot Training: additional minimum service
requirements are imposed by 32 C.F.R. § 888c.20 (1973) on Air Force Officers who elect to
attend pilot training. Mosley v. Commanding Officer, 480 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1973).
NESEP (Naval Enlisted Scientific Education Program): this program involves a contrac-
tual relationship between the Department of the Navy and the applicant, invoking no statu-
tory authority beyond the funding provisions of the defense appropriation acts. The member
signs a form by which he agrees to serve nine months of active duty as an officer for each six
months of college education sponsored by the Navy. Miller v. Chafee, 462 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.
1972).
Air Force Academy: 10 U.S.C. § 9348(a)(2)(1970) requires Academy cadets to sign an
agreement to accept appointment to serve for at least five years following graduation. McCul-
lough v. Seamans, 348 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
There is evidence that the armed services hope to rely increasingly on these programs to
secure volunteers who will place valuable skills at the disposal of the military. With the draft
no longer available as an incentive to enlist, the Navy, for example remains "optimistic that
we can [retain quality personnel], especially if we properly use the lure of education and
training as an incentive for recruiting and retention." Statement of the Director of Naval
Education and Training, United States Navy, Hearings on S. 1263 Before the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, at 5672 (1973).
In addition, the Department of Defense Tuition Assistance programs for undergraduate
education alone are expected to show an increase from 32,630 participants in fiscal 1974 to
49,960 participants for fiscal 1975. Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 12564 Before
Subcomm. No. 2 (Military Personnel) of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 2956 (1974).
2 Section VI(c)2 of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1300.6 states that:
"[Plersons with less than 180 days' service who are determined to be conscientious objectors
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fusal to serve the specified tour of duty on the basis of conscientious
objection to military activity is uniquely troublesome because it
places the nonperforming individual beyond the reach of the re-
maining effective remedies of induction and prosecution.
Conscientious objector status, at first available only to those
inducted under the Selective Service System, was extended to indi-
viduals already on active duty by a Defense Department Directive
in 1962. 3 The services at first treated the exemption, which provides
for the discharge of conscientious objectors with more than 180 days
of active duty, as entirely within their discretion. By 1968, however,
the federal courts4 had asserted a right of limited judicial review
whereby the record of the military administrative proceedings may
be examined and the applicant discharged from service by a writ of
habeas corpus if no "basis in fact" is found for an adverse decision.5
These developments, combined with the Supreme Court's relaxa-
tion of the requirements for conscientious objector classification,6
have brought sharply into focus the question of the Government's
recourse when in-service 7 recipients of educational benefits are dis-
charged as conscientious objectors while still owing terms of active
and whose request for separation is made early enough so that discharge will occur prior to
completion of 180 days' active duty will be separated early enough to permit the remaining
service in the civilian work program administered by Selective Service." The alternative
service apparatus has not been available since November, 1974, when all those in the civilian
work program were to be released and the program terminated. See Selective Service Tempo-
rary Instruction, 17 Oct. 1974, Subject: Early Release from Alternative Service. Although the
program has ended, it may be reactivated in the future if the number of conscientious
objectors becomes large enough to make the program economically efficient. The Department
of Defense Directive has not been amended to take into account the temporary termination
of the alternative service program.
I DoD Directive 1300.6 is implemented by the following regulations of the service:
For the Army: Army Regulation (AR) 635-20 (July 31, 1970), as revised, October 1971; for
the Navy: Bureau of Personnel Notice (BuPersNote) 1900.6 (Oct. 20, 1971); for the Air Force:
Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35-24 (Oct. 18, 1971); for the Marine Corps: Marine Corps Order
(MCO) 1306.16o (Nov. 19, 1971).
I The litigation concerning in-service conscientious objectors who have received educa-
tional benefits takes place only in the federal courts and is governed by federal law. This is
because the "scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between persons
in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources." United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306 (1947).
See Brown v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005
(1968); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968).
6 See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)- United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965).
' In this comment, "in-service" will be used to designate any individual who has made
an agreement to serve a tour of duty in exchange for educational benefits. Thus, the term
will refer to individuals who are still attending educational institutions as well as those on
active duty.
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duty." Since no other recourse is provided by statute or regulation,
the services are left to whatever judicial remedies they might have
under their contracts with the defaulting individuals.
With respect to the judicial remedies available to the United
States as a plaintiff in civil litigation, it is a settled rule that the
courts are open to the United States as they are to private citizens
While as a sovereign the United States may not be sued without its
consent,'" it may, like a private litigant, maintain any appropriate
action at law or in equity to enforce its contracts." Furthermore, the
construction of contracts between the Government and individuals
is determined by reference to the general rules governing the inter-
pretation of contracts between private individuals. The fact that the
United States is a party to a contract is not material with respect
to the obligations of the parties under the terms of the contract.'2
The general rule that the United States might seek the same
legal and equitable remedies available to private parties in a con-
tractual relationship has been called into question by McCullough
v. Seamans.'3 In this case the Government sought restitution for
educational benefits conferred on members of the armed forces who
requested discharge as conscientious objectors. In spite of what was
apparently a good cause of action at common law, the district court
treated the case as nonjusticiable and deferred to the Congress for
the creation of any liability. In reaching this conclusion the court
held that the case raised a "fiscal question" inappropriate for judi-
cial determination.
This comment argues that the McCullough case does present a
justiciable issue and that the Government should be allowed to
recover the costs of educating a nonperforming service member on
a theory of unjust enrichment. Part I of the comment examines the
general judicial response to the issue of in-service conscientious
objectors who have received educational benefits and identifies the
Other unanticipated difficulties are described in Cusick, In-Service Conscientious
Objection, 25 JAG. J. 35 (1970).
, See, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940); Curtner v. United States,
149 U.S. 662 (1893).
0 On sovereign immunity generally, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§
25.01-25.17 (1958).
" See, e.g., United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213 (1896); United States v. Pinson, 102
U.S. 548 (1880).
12 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571 (1934). The Government is treated differently in that it is not barred by laches, statutes
of limitation, or estoppel. On this point, see Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United
States, 250 U.S. 123 (1919); United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213 (1896).
" 348 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
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weaknesses and problems raised by the reasoning and result in the
McCullough decision. Part II discusses the precedents on which
McCullough rests and shows why reliance on these precedents is
misplaced. This section then analyzes the McCullough fact situa-
tion within the more relevant framework presented by the Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr in order to demonstrate that the issue raised
is appropriate for judicial determination. Part III of the comment
explores the nature of the contractual remedy which the Govern-
ment should be allowed to pursue in suits against in-service objec-
tors.
I. THE JUDIcIAL RESPONSE TO THE ISSUE
The federal district courts which first dealt with the issue of in-
service conscientious objectors owing military duty in exchange for
educational benefits had no difficulty in dealing with the problem. 4
These courts mistakenly believed that all conscientious objectors
remained subject to the alternative civilian service program oper-
ated by the Selective Service System; the habeas corpus writs in
these cases were conditioned on the petitioners' agreement to per-
form such service. 5 In 1973 the Eighth Circuit, after analyzing the
applicable statutes and regulations, concluded that the district
courts had no authority so to condition the habeas corpus writs. 6
In the same year the Tenth Circuit held that the imposition of any
conditions on the conscientious objector discharge is an issue which
should be resolved in Congress "and not in the federal courts on a
case by case basis."'1 7 Thus, the use of the alternative service mecha-
nism has been effectively precluded in cases of this type in the
absence of explicit Congressional direction."
Courts have also attempted to attach other conditions to the
writ of habeas corpus to ensure that the Government is not preju-
diced by the default of the conscientious objector. In Miller v.
1, Strait v. Laird, 464 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1972); Packard v. Rollins, 422 F.2d 525 (8th Cir.
1970); -United States -ex rel Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1969); Osborne v.
Seamans, 318 F. Supp. 41 (D. Md. 1970); Moore v. Connell, 318 F. Supp. 884 (D. Md. 1970).
11 The district courts conditioned the writs sua sponte; the Government did not seek such
a remedy.
16 Mosely v. Commanding Officer, 480 F.2d 1107 (8th Cir. 1973).
17 Smith v. Laird, 486 F.2d 307, 314 (1973).
"8 This comment takes the position that the imposition of the alternative service remedy
is a matter which should be left to the Congress to decide. This position is taken because such
a remedy is not a regular contractual remedy of the type which would be available if the
litigation were between private parties. The comment argues that the Government should be
allowed to pursue common law contractual remedies, not that it should have remedies based
on the peculiarities of the Government-citizen relationship.
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Chafee,'9 a member of the Navy had applied for conscientious objec-
tor status after four years of sponsored undergraduate education.
The district court conditioned the writ of habeas corpus on the
petitioner's agreement to repay the Government the entire cost of
his education. The Ninth Circuit invalidated this condition as "an
unauthorized burden on Miller's exercise of his right to seek consci-
entious objector status, impairing his First Amendment rights."2
This appeal to the Constitution as the ground for voiding the condi-
tional writ has, as yet, attracted no adherents, nor is it likely to do
so in the future. The Ninth Circuit panel failed to recognize that the
federal courts have consistently held that the Constitution does not
require exemption from military duty for conscientious objectors. 2'
The district court in the McCullough case also refused to im-
pose liability for educational costs on in-service conscientious objec-
tors, but rested its decision on more ambitious grounds which poten-
tially have undesirable consequences for the Government as a plain-
tiff in civil litigation. In this case two graduates of the Air Force
Academy, still owing five years of active duty each in exchange for
their Academy educations, had filed for discharge as conscientious
objectors while attending law school. The Air Force rejected their
applications and the applicants petitioned the court for writs of
habeas corpus. The writs were issued and the Air Force counter-
claimed, choosing to rely on the common law theory that the appli-
cants had rescinded their service contracts and should make restitu-
tion to restore the status quo ante. The Air Force asked that each
applicant be required to pay $53,575 to the Government for the cost
of educational benefits received.
In refusing to reach the merits of the Government's counter-
claim, Chief Judge MacBride asserted that the issue was "essen-
tially a question of fiscal policy far too involved for simple contract
principles to settle. ' 22 The court viewed the government counter-
claim as an attempt to create a new type of liability where none
had existed before.23 The court was also concerned about its in-
ability to balance the policy considerations involved in this issue;
" 462 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 338.
21 See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); United States v. Fleming, 344
F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1965); Bouziden v. United States, 251 F.2d 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 927 (1958). Although commentators have recently criticized these decisions the
Miller opinion made no use of their objections. See, e.g., Lurie, Conscientious Objection: The
Constitutional Questions, 73 W. VA. L. REV. 138 (1971); Comment, 56 CAL. L. REv. 379 (1968).
n 348 F. Supp. 511, 513 (1972).
3 Id.
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such a balancing process was seen as a legislative, not a judicial,
function.2 4 The court found support in two Supreme Court decisions
for its reliance on the fiscal question concept of deference to the
Congress,25 and, in concluding that the issue was inappropriate for
judicial determination, implicitly relied primarily on the separation
of powers doctrine.2 1
There are two major defects in the reasoning employed by the
court in McCullough. The first defect has to do with the quality of
the analysis presented by the court; the court's analysis is not suffi-
ciently critical or discriminating to justify the result which is
reached.2 7 Whenever a court reaches a decision which is contrary to
established precedent, as is the result in McCullough, that court
should assume the obligation to explicate fully its rationale. The
court in McCullough, however, fails to do this; instead, the court
relies urncritically on the conclusory term "fiscal" to justify its deci-
sion that the issue is nonjusticiable. The creation of an ill-defined
class of fiscal questions which demand deference to the Congress
would place an unwelcome gloss on the common law; if such a
category exists, clearer guidelines are needed than those provided
by Judge MacBride.
As long as legislatures are not omniscient, there will always be
gaps in any statutory scheme; common law courts have traditionally
filled these gaps when, as in McCullough, the common law claim is
well-supported by legal theory and custom. If a common law court
refuses to fill in the gaps left by a statutory scheme, then it is issuing
an open invitation to the avoidance of obligations. This ill-effect
should not require the courts to decide all meritorious common law
claims which do not rest on explicit statutory authority; it does
mean, however, that the decision not to decide must be thorough,
particularized, and sensitive to the consequences of the result. The
court's failure to provide such an analysis in McCullough detracts
from the force and credibility of the decision.
11 The policy considerations supporting the various positions of this issue are enumer-
ated, but not analyzed, by the court at 348 F. Supp. 511, 513 (1972). There is no effort to
probe the considerations to determine the difficulty of each factor or to determine which
considerations demand the closest legislative attention. The court is content with a mere
listing of factors from which it concludes that the issue is nonjusticiable.
zI The decisions are United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), and United
States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). For a fuller discussion of these cases, see text and notes
at notes 32-40 infra.
" While the court does not use the term "separation of powers," this is clearly what is
meant by the repeated references to the "political processes of Congress" and the superior
competence of the legislature to weigh vexing questions of public policy.
" See text and note at note 13 supra.
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The second defect in the McCullough reasoning concerns the
analytical framework employed by the court. Not only did the court
fail to justify its use of the fiscal question concept, but it appears
that the court ignored a well-developed doctrine expressly intended
for use in cases like McCullough. This doctrine is the political ques-
tion doctrine as expounded in the leading case of Baker v. Carr.2
In Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court stated that "it is the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government . . .which gives rise to the 'political ques-
tion.' " 9 It is this same concern for the separation of powers that led
the court in McCullough to its decision; however, instead of relying
on the more recent and relevant Baker decision, Judge MacBride
sought support in Supreme Court decisions announced in 1947 and
1954.3 Baker v. Carr provides an explicit analytical framework for
deciding the question of nonjusticiability in the context of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Instead of using this framework, Judge
MacBride resorted to the type of "semantic cataloguing" which was
disapproved in Baker v. Carr.3 1 The following section of this com-
ment will seek to remedy the McCullough court's deficiencies in
reasoning by analyzing the facts and precedents relied upon in light
of the analytical framework provided in Baker v. Carr.
I1. MCCULLOUGH AND NONJUSTICIABILITY
A. The Precedents Relied Upon
The rule of restraint announced in McCullough purported to
find support in two Supreme Court decisions. The earlier of
these-United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California32 -involved
a claim by the Government for loss of services and medical expenses
arising out of a soldier's injuries caused by the negligence of defen-
dant's employee. Having asserted its authority to make a rule, the
Court declined to do so, deferring instead to the Congress to create
liability. The Court gave a number of reasons for this decision: that
the Government sought to create a new type of liability unknown
to the common law;33 that the question raises broad issues of fiscal
policy beyond the powers of tort law to accommodate; 34 that since
2a 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
1 See cases cited at note 25 supra.
31 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
32 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
3 Id. at 305 n.5, 314.
11 Id. at 314.
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Congress must have been aware of tortious interference with govern-
ment employees, its failure to act by legislation shows its acquiesc-
ence in the lack of a remedy;" and that the Government, unlike a
private party, can provide its own recourse by statute.36 Each of the
reasons advanced by the Court is supported by thorough research
and an adequate examination of the consequences of the analysis
put forth.
The other case cited in McCullough is United States v.
Gilman.3 7 Like Standard Oil, it involved a government suit in tort.
The United States had been held liable under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the negligence of its employee and sought to recover
from the employee under the rule that one who has been held liable
under respondeat superior may sue for reimbursement from the neg-
ligent servant. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, empha-
sized that the matter was in court only because the Government had
consented to be sued initially under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
which has no provision for the liability of government employees.3 1
The majority also claimed, in a footnote, to find positive evidence
in the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act that Congress did
not intend to create a cause of action against the Government's
employees 9.3 The final reason for dismissal relied upon by the Court
in Gilman was borrowed from the Standard Oil decision. The Court
found that the suit raised fiscal questions better addressed by the
Congress-in particular, whether the good relations of the Govern-
ment with its employees should outweigh the Treasury's need to be
compensated for its loss.4"
The McCullough decision can be distinguished on several
grounds from the precedents on which it relies.4 For purposes of this
analysis, however, only one of these distinguishing characteristics is
significant. The McCullough decision, unlike Standard Oil and
Id. at 315.
" Id. at 315-16.
37 347 U.S. 507 (1954).
Id. at 509.
Id. at-511, n.2.
' Id. at 511-13.
4' Unlike the Standard Oil majority, the McCullough court did not purport to find the
common law doctrine presented unpersuasive; nor could it have assumed that Congress had
known of the problem for some time and had intentionally declined to act. In McCullough
the problem involved probably was not of the magnitude which would have attracted the
attention of Congress independently and probably was not dealt with in the Selective Service
Act because of the insignificance of in-service conscientious objection prior to the Vietnam
era. -Moreover, unlike Gilman, the McCullough court did not rely on legislative history or on
the view that the case was really governed by a statute in which the relief demanded had no
place.
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Gilman, relies entirely on the fiscal question concept without careful
supporting analysis of the type found in the two Supreme Court
decisions. Thus, the strength of the McCullough decision must be
measured by the strength and appropriateness of the analytical con-
cept that Judge MacBride employed. Although it cannot be
doubted that it was proper for the Supreme Court in Standard Oil
and Gilman to employ the fiscal question concept as a single strand
in the development of each of the decisions, it is more difficult to
justify the McCullough court's uncritical reliance on the concept. At
the time Standard Oil and Gilman were decided there had been no
exhaustive study or definitive pronouncement by the Supreme
Court on the issue of judicial restraint based on the separation of
powers. The decision in Baker v. Carr has, however, provided such
an analysis, an analytic construct which the McCullough court
chose to ignore. It is to Baker v. Carr that this comment now turns
in order to examine more closely and systematically the fiscal ques-
tion doctrine and to provide a more satisfactory examination of the
justiciability of cases similar to McCullough.
B. The Baker v. Carr Framework
In Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court was faced with the claim
that the existing apportionment of the Tennessee state legislature
produced inequality of representation and thus was a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
district court had dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
of the subject matter and for want of a justiciable issue. The Court
reversed, holding that a claim that the apportionment of a state
legislature denied equal protection presented a justiciable issue.
The Court consciously went further in its analysis than was neces-
sary to resolve the case in order to present a definitive pronounce-
ment on the political question doctrine.42 The Court repeatedly
made the point that independent inquiry is necessary in each case
to establish the existence of a political question.43 In addition to this
admonition, the Court provided a list of six factors" which must be
2 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962).
13 Id. at 210-11, 211, 217.
" Only three of the factors will be discussed in the text. The remaining three may be
treated more briefly as follows: (1) "[A] lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving" the issue, 369 U.S. at 217. In deciding the in-service conscientious
objector cases, separate standards are needed for determining (a) liability and (b) damages.
The standards developed in common law contract and restitution cases provide the liability
standards. For the development of standards with respect to damages in these cases, see text
and notes at notes 72-74 infra. (2) "[An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
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considered in determining if an issue is nonjusticiable by virtue of
the political question doctrine. It is clear that "unless one of these
[factors] is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal"4 on the ground of the political question doctrine.
The first factor listed by the Court in Baker is a "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department."46 The fiscal power of the Congress, as
textually granted by the Constitution, includes the power to levy
taxes and to appropriate funds as needed in support of the national
government's functions.4 7 It would be novel to suggest that the pre-
rogatives associated with the taxation and appropriation powers
extend to every monetary claim made on behalf of the Treasury 8
Such a rule has the potential to make every suit by the United
States on a government contract, for example, a legislative ques-
tion. While it is prudent for the courts to decline to create wholly
new classes of public obligations which the Treasury is unprepared
to meet,4" there is no reason emanating from the text of the Consti-
tution that requires a special statutory mandate to enforce an obli-
gation owed to the Government if the Government's claim is well-
supported at common law.
Additional considerations support this conclusion. Even though
the "textually demonstrable commitment" factor probably could
not have been established in this case under the standard as ex-
pressed in Baker, the Supreme Court has further narrowed the con-
political decision already made." 369 U.S. at 217. This factor is not applicable since no
previous political decisions have been made on the subject by Congress. (3) The "potentiality
of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion." 369 U.S. at 217. Embarassment for the executive branch is likely to occur if the courts
do not decide the issue, for it is the executive which has initially chosen to bring the suit.
Furthermore, since Congress is not likely to pass legislation on this specific issue (see note 41
supra), it is unlikely that such embarassment will result.
I 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
49 Id.
" U.S. CONST., art. 1, §§ 8-9.
Is It is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between the situation where the Govern-
ment is the plaintiff in a civil suit and where the Government is the defendant. In the latter
case, suit cannot be brought against the Government in the absence of an explicit congres-
sional waiver of sovereign immunity. The implication of the McCullough decision is that
explicit legislative approval is needed for the Government to act as a plaintiff in support of
its interests and rights. The need for symmetrical treatment of the Government as a defen-
dant and as a plaintiff with respect to congressional approval has not heretofore been estab-
lished in the American legal system. Indeed, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the
established rule concerning the Government as a plaintiff (see notes 9-12 supra) have always
co-existed.
'" This would have been the case if, for example, the courts rather than the Congress had
waived sovereign immunity to suit in tort.
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tours of this factor in Powell v. McCormack.5 Under the standard
announced in that case, something more than a mere textual com-
mitment must be found;" in the case of the taxation and appropria-
tion powers, there is no textual reference at all to suits by the
Government on monetary matters or to fiscal powers in general.
The decision as to whether a suit on a government contract should
be allowed has not been committed specifically and textually to
the Congress by the Constitution.
Another significant factor presented in Baker is the "impossi-
bility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without ex-
pressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the govern-
ment."52 In the case of in-service conscientious objectors, it is the
executive branch which is bringing the suit and, therefore, judicial
resolution would not be disrespectful to this branch of the national
government. In addition, it is likely that cases like McCullough will
not be brought frequently and thus the total amount of money in-
volved will not be significant in relation to the total national budget.
Because of the minor impact of these cases, this issue is unlikely to
be even addressed by the Congress;53 disrespect would not be shown
the Congress by deciding such a case.
The likelihood of congressional action on a given issue is a
relevant factor in determining the chances for conflict with a coordi-
nate branch; the McCullough court failed to analyze and appreciate
this element of the situation. While it appears that the likelihood
of confrontation between the judiciary and the legislature is slight
in this situation, there is a readily available solution if a disagree-
ment should develop. 4 The Congress can override the decision of the
court simply by passing a statute." Thus, it is exceedingly unlikely
395 U.S. 486 (1969).
" This extra element consists of positive evidence that the Framers of the Constitution
intended the specific action at issue to be committed to a particular branch of the national
government. It is not sufficient that the authority for the contested action can be inferred
from more specific grants of power.
52 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
1 See note 41 supra, concerning the most likely reason for this gap in this statutory
scheme.
51 The legal system has shown that it can deal with confrontations of a much greater
magnitude than is represented by the in-service conscientious objector issue. See, e.g.,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Indeed, the checks and balances doctrine which is so basic
to the American constitutional system actually requires a certain amount of confrontation
among the branches of the national government.
- This is precisely what the Congress did in response to United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-53 (1970). There have been no evident
repercussions of the type feared in Baker v. Carr because of this action.
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that disrespect of a magnitude uncommon to our legal system will
develop if the courts hear the Government's claim against in-service
conscientious objectors who have received educational benefits.
The final factor presented in Baker v. Carr is the "impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion." This factor is most relevant to the in-
service objector issue since it is the reason underlying the
McCullough decision. This factor, however, should not be a bar to
the justiciability of cases like McCullough. Policy questions such as
whether the loss to taxpayers from forgiving the obligations owed by
in-service objectors should outweigh the deference to be paid to
conscience are, of course, matters which might interest Congress.
And a weighing of such public policy considerations might, once
undertaken, produce a result different from that of contract law.
But this reasoning proves too much: the possibility of displacement
by statute on political grounds is common to all the remaining pre-
serves of common law.
While judge-made and statutory law supplement one another,
they are the result of quite different processes, responding to dif-
ferent pressures and seeking-whatever the extent of overlap-
different ends. Statutory law, made in pursuit of political, eco-
nomic, or social ends, may effectively abolish common law rights
and liabilities. No-fault insurance statutes are a stark example of
this type of displacement. Abolition occurs, however, not because
common law is inadequate on its own terms to decide cases of a
given kind, but because a political decision is made that particular
economic and social needs must prevail over judge-made rights and
obligations. The McCullough theory would apparently enable courts
to anticipate this process and to abrogate their jurisdiction accord-
ingly 56
The case of no-fault automobile compensation plans serves as
an example of the McCullough theory's potential. The judiciary has
surely been aware for some time of the rising social costs of acci-
dents. It would have taken little imagination to suppose that legisla-
tures, confronted with the policy questions concerning the
distribution of these costs, might be interested in finding less costly
ways of dealing with the problem. Yet few would think it helpful if
the courts, before the legislatures take any action, were to declare
58 This comment, on the other hand, argues that the process of court decision followed
by legislative action, if thought necessary, should not be abrogated in the absence of more
compelling reasons and analysis than are presented by the McCullough court.
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damage suits arising from automobile accidents nonjusticiable be-
cause of the policy questions they raise.
The McCullough opinion suggests a false dichotomy with re-
spect to the ability of courts to weigh policy considerations. The
decision suggests that courts must either decide cases without refer-
ence to broader policy questions, or decline jurisdiction and hope
that the legislature will make law that accommodates the broader
equities. In fact, courts have shown considerable ability to weigh
policy considerations and to produce decisions and rules which take
them into account. The products liability decisions of the California
Supreme Court 57 under Chief Justice Traynor rely on policy consid-
erations which could have been dismissed as too complex for judicial
treatment. Yet these decisions are no more legislative for taking into
account policy considerations than no-fault statutes are judicial
because they overturn much of what judges have built.
In McCullough the coqrt was presented a concrete case between
adverse parties who would be certain to represent effectively their
points of view and who would be individually affected by the out-
come of the suit. The court did not claim a judicial decision would
work injustice to the litigants. Rather, the court suggested that, as
prospective rules, the liability demanded might strike the Congress
as fiscally defective. If there is such a defect it is only for the Con-
gress-not the court-to determine. The first task of a court remains
to declare the rights of the parties who stand before it. The Baker
formulation would have the courts abrogate this important function
only when the policy concerns are "clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion;" no policy concerns present in the McCullough case are suffi-
cient to justify the extreme step of declaring an issue nonjusticiable.
To be sure, policy issues are present in the case,58 but the legal
grounds on which to decide the issues of liability and damages are
sufficiently clear so that they should not be submerged by these
policy concerns.
I. THE CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
WHO HAVE RECEIVED EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
If the foregoing conclusion that the Government should have
the right to sue at common law in cases like McCullough is ac-
cepted, then the question of the liability of conscientious objectors
"7 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
" See note 24 supra.
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owing terms of service promised in exchange for educational bene-
fits would be one for ordinary principles of contract law to resolve.59
The facts of McCullough and similar cases are sufficient to prove
liability and damages for breach of the agreement to serve.
The educational programs in question all involve reciprocal
promises by the service member and the Government. The pledge
by the military to finance particular education or training is con-
tractual consideration for the serviceman's promise to make his
skills available to the military for a fixed period of time. The duty
to serve is absolute upon completion of the government-financed
education.
Those who complete government-financed education, and are
subsequently discharged as conscientious objectors, have failed to
perform as promised. This failure to perform is not privileged; the
Directive authorizing conscientious objector discharges purports to
affect no legal relationship beyond the duty of continued military
service." The Directive does not state or imply that those who qual-
ify for its protection are thereby released from ordinary contractual
obligations.
It has been suggested, however, that the duty of performance
on the part of conscientious objectors may be treated as discharged
by supervening impossibility of performance." The rationale is that
development of conscientious objection is involuntary and resem-
bles other unforeseen events which intervene between the making
of a promise and the time appointed for its performance. Discharge
for impossibility, if found, might give rise to a claim by the Govern-
ment for restitution of the value of any benefits received by the
conscientious objector, but would avoid the claim of breach of con-
tract. 2
The difficulty with this view is that it makes involuntariness
the sine qua non of impossibility. In fact, the operative distinction
is not between voluntary and involuntary, but between subjective
and objective impossibility.6 3 If a supervening event makes it impos-
"' This would be, in other words, a return to the established rules concerning the status
of the Government as a plaintiff in civil litigation whereby the Government is entitled to
seek normal judicial remedies for the violation of its common law rights. See text and notes
at notes 9-12 supra.
" DoD Directive 1300.6 (1962).
61 Such a suggestion is made in Albrecht, Recovery of Government-Funded Education
Expenses, 26 JAG. J. 157, 160 (1972).
62 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, § 108(c) (1937); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 468(2)
(1932).
63 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 455, comment a: "It is the difference between 'the thing
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sible for anyone to perform the obligation-as when the unique
subject matter of a bargain is destroyed-then the duty may be
discharged because of objective impossibility. Events such as insol-
vency," on the other hand, which may be equally unwilled and
unforeseen, prevent only the particular promisor's performance.
They are termed subjective and do not discharge the promisor's
obligation. The quickening of conscience which leads a service
member to seek conscientious objector status is a more difficult
case, but it appears to be similar to the case of bankruptcy for
purposes of classifying the event as subjective or objective. The
unique subject of the bargain-the conscientious objector's physical
ability to serve-has not been destroyed; only his willingness to
serve has become impossible.
A more interesting approach to the question of whether the
duty of the conscientious objector has been discharged is that of
assumption of risk. 5 The relevant inquiry with respect to this ap-
proach concerns the question of whether the Government, either
expressly or by implication, has shown its intention to absorb losses
from this source. The matter is often phrased in the following man-
ner: if the Government had bargained with the defendant on this
issue, would the Government have agreed to bear this loss?"
The best, albeit not conclusive, evidence available on this point
is the Government's behavior when it has bargained over similar
risks. The petitioners in the conscientious objector cases share two
relevant categorical traits: they are conscientious objectors, and
they are recipients of educational benefits which carry a service
commitment. The Government has addressed the issue, as to each
category of persons, of the obligations which accompany the privi-
lege of being excused from performance of the military obligation
which has been undertaken.
Conscientious objectors receive statutory attention in the
Selective Service Act. Those who are excused from military duty on
the basis of conscientious objection are required to perform alterna-
tive civilian service of value to the nation for a period equal in length
cannot be done' and 'I cannot do it' ". The promisor's obligation is discharged only in the
former case.
" See, e.g., Christy v. Pilkinton, 244 Ark. 407, 273 S.W. 2d 533 (1954); Title and Trust
Co. v. Durkheimer Inv. Co., 155 Ore. 427, 451-52, 63 P.2d 909, 919 (1936).
1 See generally F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRAMCS: CASES AND MATERIALS 742-82 (2d
Ed. 1969).
" See, e.g., National Presto Industries Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965).
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to that of the general military obligation. 7 The legislative history
of this remedy shows an intention to prevent abuse of the exemption
by ensuring that it confers no absolute privilege of escape from the
universal duty to serve. The aim of the alternative service remedy
is deterrence; punitive purposes are expressly rejected. 9
Among the various military educational programs, the service
academies are governed by the most elaborate statutory scheme.
The obligation imposed on a cadet who refuses his commission, and
thereby avoids his obligation to perform five years of commissioned
service, is a maximum four-year tour of enlisted duty.7° Here, as in
the statute governing pre-induction conscientious objectors, the
remedy provided ensures that the service obligation is not avoided
altogether and that some work of national importance is done by the
non-performing cadet. No punitive measures are authorized; the
cadet does not have to repay the cost of his education.
If the remedies provided by statute are a reliable guide, the
Government would not have bargained away all right of recovery for
breach of contract if the question of conscientious objection had
been raised during negotiations with the recipients of educational
benefits. Although there has never been an explicit provision au-
thorizing monetary recovery by the Government in the case of con-
scientious objectors or recipients of educational benefits, this omis-
sion can be explained by the fact that the superior remedies of
,1 Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended 50 U.S.C. § 456(j)
(1970).
" "Alternative service" began informally during World War I when the War Department
furloughed objectors who refused to perform even noncombatant duties with the combat
forces to Red Cross and agricultural work vital to the nation. The Third Assistant Secretary
of War summarized the policy this way in 1918:
In short, every effort is being made to respect the sincere scruples of a small minority
of our people, at the same time that their power to contribute to the nation's efficiency
is turned to good account; ..... a method which conserves the manpower of the Nation,
and accords to furloughed objectors a lot that is endurable and serviceable, but in no
sense pampered, will, it is believed, commend itself to the common sense and practi-
cality of the American people."
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM SPECIAL MONOGRAPH 11, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION at 63
[hereinafter cited as MONOGRAPH].
It was this program which, largely at the urging of religious groups who gave extensive
congressional testimony on the question, was used as the model for the alternative service
provision of the Selective Service Act of 1940. The provision was carried over into the 1948
act without debate. See Id. at 69.
,1 While it is true that most alternative service during World War II was performed in
civilian-run camps, these were an outgrowth of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps al-
ready in operation. The point of using camps was no more punitive than under the CCC; it
was an administratively convenient way of ensuring that work of acknowledged public im-
portance would be done by the objectors. See MONOGRAPH at 160-61.
70 10 U.S.C. § 9348 (1970).
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induction and alternative service have been available. In cases like
McCullough, however, the induction remedy of the academy stat-
utes cannot be imposed. In addition, alternative service, while use-
ful to the nation, does not meet any specific purpose for which the
military has bargained. Thus, it can be argued with some confidence
that the military would have bargained for a contractual liability
provision which would benefit the services more directly-in this
case, a recovery for funds expended to educate the nonperforming
individual. If the military is able to recover such funds, there is a
greater likelihood that the total effective monetary commitment to
military-sponsored education for the purpose of producing commis-
sioned officers will not be reduced significantly.7'
Once the Government has proved contractual liability, it must
choose between the two remedies available in this situation. The
Government might treat its contract with the conscientious objec-
tors as rescinded and seek restitution, or it might enforce the con-
tract and demand to be compensated for the loss of the benefit of
its bargain. The choice will make little practical difference where,
as in Smith v. Laird,72 the Government merely paid the defendant's
tuition at a civilian university. Contract damages would be subject
to the duty to mitigate and would likely amount to tuition plus the
costs incurred by the service in securing another trainee to replace
the defendant.13 Restitution,74 on the other hand, would amount to
restoration of the tuition amount to the Government.
Providing education at the service academies presents a more
difficult problem. Since the Government pays the entire cost of
running these institutions, a claim for restitution might seek either
of two measures of recovery: the defaulting cadet's share of the cost
of running the academy (the Government's reliance interest), or the
amount of tuition the cadet would have paid to secure an equivalent
education in a civilian university (the amount of the cadet's unjust
71 If the government is able to recover the funds spent on educating nonperforming
individuals through judicial action, there is greater likelihood that this money will be used
for the same purpose in the future; that is, to replenish the funds previously appropriated
but spent on the educations of persons who did not become commissioned officers as in-
tended. If, however, these funds are not recovered, it is not clear that the Congress will
appropriate sufficient funds to affect the reduction in the number of commissioned officers
caused by the in-service conscientious objector provision.
72 486 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1973).
" See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1096; 5 S. WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRAcTs
§ 1362A (Rev. ed. 1937).
11 For an explanation of the concepts of restitution, reliance interest, and unjust enrich-
ment, see Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 56
(1936).
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enrichment). In McCullough, the Government sought the former,
larger measure of recovery.
There are at least two reasons for preferring that the Govern-
ment be permitted to recover no more than the amount of a cadet's
true unjust enrichment from attending a service academy. First,
and less important, this alternative presents fewer problems of mea-
surement. Merely dividing the cost of running an academy by the
number of cadets, and treating the result as the defendant's share,
begs the question of causation. Many costs are more or less fixed,
so that if the defaulting cadet had not attended and no one had been
there in his place, the cost of running the institution would not have
been reduced in proportion.
Given the flaws in this method of measurement, the preferable
measure of unjust enrichment would appear to be the amount of
tuition which the nonperforming cadet would have paid at a civilian
university. This method presents but one major problem, that of
determining whether the tuition at a state (public) or private uni-
versity is to be used in determining the amount owed by the cadet.
Since an inquiry into the cadet's pre-college 5 plans would thrust the
court into the unwieldy stance of determining past and perhaps
indeterminable motives; this technique should not be employed.
Rather, a sounder approach would be to assess the nonperforming
cadet an amount which corresponds to the average of the tuition
cost at public and private universities for a given year.76 This ap-
proach avoids inquiry into motives, provides the court with definite
cost figures with which to work, and arrives at a fair cost for deter-
mining unjust enrichment.
The stronger reason for not imposing the more onerous reliance
measure of restitution is its punitive effect. Granting remedies such
as the $53,575 demanded in McCullough would tend to discourage
the legitimate exercise of the conscientious objector privilege. The
recourse provided for the Government under the Selective Service
System evidences a congressional purpose to deter abuse of the
privilege while scrupulously avoiding punitive measures against
those who invoke it. 77 A similar, nonpunitive intent appears in the
11 Pre-college refers to any period before the specific decision deciding which educational
program is to be pursued, not just to the decision with respect to undergraduate education.
78 Various professional organizations, such as the American Association of Colleges and
Universities and the American Association of University Professors, provide annual figures
which show the median tuition cost of public and private education in various regions of the
United States. These sources can provide the courts with realistic and definite cost figures
as to the cost of education.
7 See text and notes at note 69 supra.
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alternative military service required of academy graduates who re-
fuse to be commissioned.78 Given this congressional attitude, the
courts should not impose crushing financial burdens on those who
exercise a statutory privilege which the Government has pledged to
respect.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that the issue raised in McCullough
does not involve a political question and that, when suing an in-
service conscientious objector, the Government should be allowed to
recover the amount of the nonperforming individual's unjust enrich-
ment. This return to the established rule that the Government
should have access to the courts to protect its interests by well-
pleaded common law suits would not require courts to ignore the
Government's peculiar position as a party to a suit. Here, as else-
where, where the Government has discretion to act or not, it should
be held to its constitutional responsibilities. If the Government en-
forces its common law rights in a discriminatory or standardless
manner, it can be denied relief. But these matters can be raised by
defendants as defenses within the structure of a lawsuit; neither
they nor the policy issues imbedded in these actions make these
suits by the Government nonjusticiable.
Charles H. Kennedy
' See text and notes at note 70 supra.
19751
